Philosophers attracted to Kantian ethics have recently followed Kant himself in focusing on the Formula of Humanity (FH) as a basis for specifying what we are morally required to do.
5 ever legitimate to kill one being with dignity, thereby saving several other such beings, it is not because it is legitimate to make an exchange of the (lesser) value inherent in the former with the (greater) value inherent in the latter. An end in itself has dignity in that it has unconditional value and nothing, not even a group of other ends in themselves, has greater value.
It is worth emphasizing that, according to Kant, all beings with humanity necessarily also possess dignity. The only way such a being can lose its dignity is by losing its humanity. 20 A person whom others hold in contempt or who even has contempt for himself does not thereby forfeit his dignity.
The Respect-Expression Approach to FH
In is the existence of a substantive value to be respected. This value does not take the form of a desired object to be brought about, but rather the value of something existing, which is to be respected, esteemed, or honored in our actions.
23
FH is a moral standard for our actions, that is, for what we intentionally do. 24 According to this principle, an action is morally permissible (in accordance with duty) just in case it expresses
proper respect for the worth of humanity, says Wood. 25 As an action-guiding principle, Wood suggests, FH amounts to the following:
RFH: Act always in a way that expresses respect for the worth of humanity, in one's own person as well as in that of another. 26 6 RFH is, of course, to be understood as a categorical imperative: a principle that all of us (human agents) have an overriding obligation to conform to, regardless of what we might be inclined to do. For the sake of ease of expression, RFH commands that we act always in a way that expresses respect, rather than proper respect for the worth of humanity. But we need to keep in mind that a type of action might express proper respect, or, in short, respect, for the worth of humanity simply by virtue of expressing no disrespect for it. The respect-expression account does not embrace the idea that every morally permissible type of action involves some positive affirmation of the value of humanity. 27 In order to derive duties from RFH to act (or refrain from acting) in certain ways we must rely on intermediate premises, according to Wood. For example, he offers the following as the sort of intermediate premise requisite to derive a duty not to make false promises: -Pf: A false promise, because its end cannot be shared by the person to whom the promise is made, frustrates or circumvents that person's rational agency, and thereby shows disrespect for it.‖ 28 The claim in
Pf that a false promise shows disrespect for the promisee's rational agency amounts for Wood to the claim that it expresses disrespect for the worth of his humanity. Assuming RFH and Pf are true, it follows that we have a duty not to make false promises. So, in short, on Wood's account moral duties to act (or refrain from acting) in certain ways do not stem directly from RFH. This principle must be coupled with intermediate premises: ones that specify whether some sort of conduct expresses respect for the worth of humanity. (If intermediate premises are necessary to derive from RFH conclusions regarding the moral permissibility of types of actions, then they are obviously also necessary to derive such conclusions regarding particular actions.)
Several points regarding Wood's characterization of intermediate premises warrant
attention. First, they are -logically independent‖ of RFH in the sense that the truth of this 7 principle does not itself guarantee the truth of any such premise. 29 That we ought to act always in a way that expresses respect for the worth of humanity does not itself entail that any particular sort of conduct in fact expresses or fails to express such respect. what an action -means‖ is subject to interpretation. Some philosophers might reject my interpretations of the actions I discuss below. But those who do should be able to explain why. If no rational argument concerning the meaning of actions is possible, then the respect-expression account renders the Formula of Humanity too indeterminate to be usable.
Self-defense
If the -meaning‖ of an action is inconsistent with the view that humanity has dignity, then the action expresses disrespect for the value of humanity and thus conflicts with RFH. (-Act always in a way that expresses respect for the worth of humanity, in one's own person as well as in that of another.‖) Many of us believe that certain actions (specified below) are morally permissible. However, RFH yields the conclusion that they are not; for the actions in question convey a message that humanity does not have the value Kant attributes to it, or so I argue. 38 It is a commonplace to hold that killing another in self-defense is, in some circumstances, morally permissible. 39 Consider the following case: A law-abiding journalist has discovered widespread financial improprieties in a large company. He has a well-grounded suspicion that a security officer employed by this company aims to kill him in order to keep him from revealing 12 what he knows. The officer follows him into an enclosed alley and approaches him with knife raised. The journalist tries, to no avail, to reason with him. He then takes out a gun and yells at the officer to stop. But he continues to move forward, now just a step away. The journalist reflects in a flash that the officer is a former paramilitary soldier and an expert in hand-to-hand combat. He concludes, very reasonably, that if he doesn't shoot to kill, he is very unlikely to escape from the situation alive.
If the journalist intentionally kills the officer in this case, he acts in self-defense and his action is morally permissible, or so many of us believe. 40 But in shooting and killing the officer, In order to see this, consider first a case of intentionally killing (and thus destroying the humanity of) an innocent, non-threatening person who wishes to remain alive. Doing so would express disrespect for the value of her humanity. It would convey a message that her humanity falls short of having unconditional and incomparable value. But now note that the value of the security officer's humanity neither disappears nor at all diminishes when he acts as a malicious aggressor. That it maintains its full value is just part of what it means to say that it has unconditional value in the Kantian sense. In destroying the officer's humanity, the journalist is destroying something no less valuable than the humanity of an innocent, non-threatening person.
If someone's killing the innocent person expresses disrespect for the value of her humanity, then 13 the journalist's killing the officer expresses disrespect for the value of his. So, according to the respect-expression view, the journalist's shooting and killing the officer in self-defense is morally impermissible. 41 Now let me consider several objections to this argument. First, one might acknowledge that on the respect-expression view an agent's having a certain mindset in acting constitutes neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for his action's expressing disrespect for humanity. A second objection begins with the claim that the right of a person not to be killed is, under normal circumstances, a consequence of his humanity's special value as invoked in RFH.
But a person can forfeit this right. When he has forfeited it, doing what would otherwise 14 constitute a violation of this right does not express disrespect for the value of his humanity.
When he tries to murder the journalist, the officer forfeits his right not to be killed. So the journalist's intentionally killing him in self-defense neither violates his right not to be killed nor expresses disrespect for the value of his humanity, concludes the objection.
In response, some prominent accounts of the legitimacy of self-defense do maintain that a would-be assassin such as the officer loses his right not to be killed. But we are focusing specifically on the implications of RFH (or, more precisely, RFH coupled with plausible intermediate premises). The officer maintains his humanity, and the value of it remains undiminished, even as he tries to commit murder. To deny the latter is to deny that humanity has unconditional value. According to the objection, the right of a person not to be killed is, under normal circumstances, a consequence of the value of his humanity. But if the value of the officer's humanity has diminished not at all, then the ground of his right not to be killed remains unaltered; it is fully present before as well as after he attempts to murder the journalist. So the objection's claim that in making this attempt he forfeits his right not to be killed is baseless.
Of course, someone might maintain that the officer's right not to be killed stems from some principle other than RFH and that when he attempts murder he does indeed forfeit that right. The journalist's intentionally killing him in self-defense might not run afoul of this other principle. But it would run afoul of RFH. The journalist wipes the officer's humanity out of existence and thereby expresses the message that it falls short of being unconditionally and incomparably valuable. 42 A third objection to my conclusion that the respect-expression view has counterintuitive implications also contends that the view stops short of implying that it is morally impermissible for the journalist to intentionally kill the officer. The objection grants that, if the journalist does so, his action expresses disrespect for the officer's humanity. But it makes a further claim, namely that, according to the respect-expression view, if the journalist does not try to kill the officer, then his action expresses disrespect for the worth of his own humanity. For if he does something less than what will maximize his chances for survival, his action conveys that his humanity does not have dignity, continues the objection. Whether the journalist tries to kill the officer or not, he expresses disrespect for someone's humanity. In a case in which whatever one does, one expresses disrespect for someone's humanity, it is morally permissible to act in whichever way one chooses, according to the objection. So, contrary to my conclusion, it would be morally permissible for the journalist to kill the officer in self-defense.
The objection depends on the claim that, according to the respect-expression view, if the journalist fails to attempt to kill the officer, then his action expresses the message that his own humanity does not have the value of an end in itself. But this claim is questionable. That the journalist refrains from trying to kill the officer does not entail that he does nothing to save his own life. Although he reasonably believes that unless he shoots to kill the officer, he will very likely die by his knife, he realizes that this outcome is not certain. He can take steps, short of shooting to kill, in order to survive. He might, for example, try to disable (but not kill) the officer by shooting him in the leg and then struggle with all his might to escape. The journalist's making such an attempt is certainly not necessary in order for him to count as exercising morally permissible self-defense, many of us believe. But in the spirit of the respect-expression view, this action would, it seems, express respect not only for the worth of his own humanity, but also for the worth of the officer's. 43 So might a less violent action, such as a renewed effort to reason with the officer and to convince him that it would be wrong, or at least imprudent, for him to stab him to death. These actions would suggest that both the journalist's own humanity and the officer's are worth preserving. Granted, if the journalist intentionally does nothing in order to save himself, as opposed, say, to doing nothing as a result of being frozen with fear, and if his doing nothing counts as an action, then his action might express disrespect for the value of his humanity. But, as we have seen, the journalist's refraining from trying to kill the officer is compatible with his making some attempt to save his own life.
Even if, contrary to my contention, whatever the journalist did short of shooting to kill would express disrespect for the value of his own humanity, the objection falls short. For it rests on the claim that if, whatever one does, one expresses disrespect for one person's humanity, it is morally permissible to act in any way one chooses. But this claim clashes with the respectexpression view itself. RFH commands: -Act always in a way that expresses respect for the worth of humanity, in one's own person as well as that of another.‖ If an action expresses disrespect for the worth of humanity, then it is morally wrong. That is the case regardless of whether, whatever one does, his action will fail to respect the worth of humanity.
An opponent who raises this third objection embraces the idea that the journalist faces a moral dilemma. Since shooting to kill is morally impermissible, he is morally required not to shoot; since refraining from shooting to kill is also morally impermissible, he is also required to shoot. Whatever he does, he will violate a moral requirement. (Of course, Kant himself rejected the possibility of there being any genuine conflict of duties. 44 So, if Kant accepted the respectexpression construal of FH, he should not accept this third objection to the conclusion that the journalist would be wrong to shoot to kill in self-defense.)
At this point, someone might grant it to be inconsistent with RFH to claim that in cases in which whatever one does one expresses disrespect for someone's humanity, whatever one does is morally permissible. Modifying the third objection, she might insist instead that in such cases This modified objection does not succeed. 47 For it does not threaten the position defended above, namely that the respect-expression view implies that some actions available to the journalist would not express disrespect for anyone's humanity and so would be morally
permissible. An example of such an action would be the journalist's trying to disable, but not kill, the officer in order to escape from him, even though he knows he will not likely succeed. 48 If this is correct, then there is no gap in RFH such that it fails to apply to the journalist in this scenario. Moreover, even if there were such a gap, RFH would fail to yield a conclusion that many of us embrace, namely that it is not wrong for the journalist to intentionally kill the officer. 49 
Withdrawal of Medical Treatment
A patient has ALS (Lou Gehrigs disease), a lethal malady the progressive symptoms of which include muscle weakness, paralysis, and eventual loss of the ability to speak, swallow, and breathe. He is on a respirator, and has no hope of living off of it. He might survive for as little as a few months or as long as a couple of years. As is typical among people with (even advanced) ALS, the patient's mind is sharp. Moreover, he does not suffer from clinical depression. As psychiatrists have confirmed, he easily meets standards of mental competence. His senses of sight, touch, and hearing are unaffected, and technology enables him to communicate and manipulate his environment. He sets and effectively pursues various ends. But he finds his condition intolerable. The patient's doctor, who knows the details of his mental and physical condition, is the only person who as a practical matter can turn off the respirator. Over several months, the patient persistently asks her to do this so that his suffering will come to an end.
Suppose that the doctor turns off his respirator. She intends the patient to die in order that he no longer suffer. Philosophers differ on whether the doctor counts as killing the patient, as opposed to letting him die. 50 But we need not enter this debate here. (My own view is that she kills him.) In any case, according to many of us the doctor's action is morally permissible. But according to the respect-expression interpretation, crystallized in RFH above, FH implies that it is not.
RFH commands that we always treat people in a way that expresses respect for the worth of their humanity. It should be obvious that the patient does indeed possess humanity. Since the onset of his disease, the range of ends he can set and reasonably expect to realize has significantly diminished. But he maintains his reason and his ability to act on self-given principles.
Moreover, the patient's humanity has the same unconditional and incomparable value it had before he got sick. Although, as a result of his suffering, the patient himself believes that it is in his interest to die, the value of his humanity diminishes not at all. Velleman, who seems to embrace a view that amounts to something like the respect-expression construal of FH, writes:
-The dignity of a person is a value that differs in kind from his interest.‖ The patient might hold that his life is no longer worth living. But, Velleman continues, a person's -dignity is a value on which his opinion carries no more weight than anyone else's.‖ 51 Even the patient's request to die has no effect on the value of his humanity. In at least some circumstances, including I think those of our example, such a request suggests the patient's denial that his humanity has dignity. But such a denial does not entail any actual loss of value. Echoing Velleman once again, a person's dignity is not a value for him, but rather a value in him. 52 Whether it is correct to say that the doctor kills the patient or that she lets him die, she terminates his aid, intending that he die and thereby suffer no more. Her action does not express a message consistent with the view that the patient's humanity is unconditionally and incomparably valuable. (Here again is an intermediate premise in Wood's sense.) Instead it sends the message that in the context of this patient's suffering and his insistence that she do something that will result in its cessation, his humanity is simply not worth preserving. The action also suggests that the patient's humanity is less valuable than it was in an earlier context, namely one in which his suffering was much less intense and he did not want to die. For in the earlier context, the doctor did not intend the patient's death. So RFH implies that it is morally wrong for the doctor to turn the respirator off. To many of us, this implication is counterintuitive.
Let me now consider replies to this objection, each of which aims to show that since the doctor's action does not express disrespect for the value of humanity, RFH does not imply that it is wrong.
First, an opponent might reply as follows: Humanity is the capacity of rational choice.
Actions express respect for the value of this capacity if they express respect for the value of its exercise. The patient exercises rational choice in setting the end of being free from suffering and pursuing it by trying to bring about his own death. The doctor's turning off the respirator undoubtedly suggests that the patient's autonomy is important; it sends a clear message that his exercise of rational choice is valuable. So, the reply concludes, her action also sends the message that his capacity of rational choice is valuable.
This reply invokes an unacceptable premise, namely that if actions express respect for the value of the exercise of the capacity of rational choice, then they express respect for the value of the capacity itself. An example will help us to see that this premise is unacceptable. Suppose that an aging poet reasonably believes the following: His poetry, which explores themes of violence and redemption, is deep and important, but underappreciated. The most efficient and perhaps the only way to draw significant attention to his work, which is by far the most important thing to him in his life, is for him to die a violent death. The poet is unable to shoot himself, so he asks an acquaintance to do it. He offers the acquaintance impeccable evidence that he is mentally competent and persistently renews his request. Now suppose that the acquaintance shoots and kills the poet. His action suggests the idea that the poet's exercise of his capacity of rational choice, namely his pursuing the end of getting his work noticed through his dying a violent death, is valuable. But it fails to send the message that this capacity itself is worth preserving.
For the acquaintance's action wipes this capacity out of existence. Suppose that instead of 21 acquiescing to the poet's request, the acquaintance refuses to shoot him and repeatedly tries to convince him that bringing attention to his work is not worth the loss of his life. This action does not express respect for the value of this particular exercise of the capacity of rational choice by the poet, but it does express respect for his capacity itself. The capacity of rational choice (humanity) is something over and above any particular exercise of this capacity. An action's expressing respect for the value of the latter is not a sufficient condition (nor is it a necessary one) for his expressing respect for the value of the former.
One might embrace this conclusion, yet insist nevertheless that the doctor's turning off the ALS patient's respirator does express respect for the value of his humanity. For in this particular case, one might claim, an action's expressing respect for the value of the exercise of the capacity of rational choice does suffice for its expressing respect for the value of the capacity itself.
But what is the justification for this claim? Granted, in some cases one's expressing respect for the value of a particular exercise of the capacity of rational choice might amount to expressing respect for the value of the capacity itself. Suppose a person lends a colleague money based on his promise to repay her by a specific date. (As the borrower is aware, the lender needs him to repay her on time so that she can make the down-payment on a home.) And in fact the borrower does repay the lender on time. Let us assume that the borrower's action of paying back the loan on time expresses respect for the value of the lender's exercise of her capacity of rational choice, that is, for the exercise of agency involved in making the loan. Perhaps, then, it thereby also expresses respect for the value of the lender's capacity, that is, her humanity, itself.
Someone might hold the doctor's action to be analogous to the borrower's. But I fail to see good reason to take this position. Both the borrower's action and the doctor's, let us grant, express 22 respect for the value of some particular use another puts to her own capacity of rational choice.
But unlike the borrower's action, the doctor's will, as she is fully aware, result in the destruction of another's capacity of rational choice. That is in short why the doctor's action expresses a message contrary to the idea that the patient's rational nature is unconditionally and incomparably valuable.
Some might be attracted to the view that an action's expressing respect for the value of the patient's exercise of his capacity of rational choice amounts to expressing respect for the value of this capacity itself for the following reason. They might assume that his capacity is, as it were, exhausted by this particular exercise of it. They might envisage the patient as so obsessed with trying to put an end to his own suffering as to be incapable of any other exercise of the capacity of rational choice. But that is simply not the patient as I have described him. He can and does pursue other ends. His capacity of rational choice has not collapsed into one use of it. So we are left with the conclusion that even though the doctor's action expresses respect for the value of a particular exercise by the patient of his capacity of rational choice, her action expresses disrespect for the value of the capacity itself. it is inspired by his comments, I do not claim that it captures his own view. In any case, the reply is not promising, or so I argue.
Let us begin by noting that the notion of dignity Velleman is using when he discusses objects such as flags is wider than the strict Kantian notion we have been employing, according to which an object has dignity just in case it has unconditional and incomparable value. Such objects have dignity, Velleman suggests, just in case they have value that is to be respected, as opposed to maximized, or in Kant's language just in case they have value as -independentlyexisting‖ ends rather than as ends -to be effected‖ (see § 1). 55 Velleman is not, of course, claiming that it is always wrong to trade off the value inherent in an American flag or a bible for that inherent in something else, say a person.
In any case, Velleman's discussion suggests the following reasoning concerning -objects of dignity‖ such as flags. When a national flag becomes irreparably tattered it typically loses its capacity to serve as a fitting emblem of the nation and thus loses at least some of the value it had as such an emblem. 56 Burning a flag that is about to irretrievably lose some of its value can express respect for it, goes the argument. It can send a message that as a result of its possessing value as such an emblem, not just any demise will do. Allowing it to forever lose its value through a process of further decay might -offend against‖ what it is and the value it possesses.
We can formulate roughly parallel reasoning regarding an ALS patient. As a result of having this disease, a patient can lose his humanity (i.e., rational nature) and thus some of his value. Acting with the intention of bringing about the death of an ALS patient who is about to lose his humanity can express respect for the value of his humanity. It can convey that as a result of his possessing humanity, and thus unconditional and incomparable value, not just any demise will do. Allowing such a patient to forever lose his value through the disease process might -offend against‖ his humanity and the value it possesses. In our example, the doctor's acting with the intention of bringing about the death of the particular patient described, one who is competent and who has asked to die, does express respect for the value of his humanity. For the doctor's not doing so and thereby allowing the patient to forever lose his value by succumbing to ALS would offend against his dignity as a person.
This argument constitutes a reply to the contention that RFH condemns the doctor's action in our original example. For although the patient has not lost his humanity he is about to.
Precisely how long before he loses it no one knows: it could be a month, it could be years.
In any case, the reply is not convincing. While undergoing the process of physical degradation that will lead to his losing his humanity, the patient might feel embarrassed, ashamed, and humiliated. His sense of self-worth might diminish. When this happens, a patient is sometimes said to have experienced a loss of dignity. 57 But a sense of self-worth is not dignity, as we have been employing the notion. A patient has dignity in our usage regardless of how high or low he believes his worth to be. He has dignity, that is unconditional and incomparable value, just as long as he has humanity. If the doctor's refraining from pulling the plug and allowing the patient's disease to destroy his humanity would -offend against‖ or constitute an -affront to‖ the patient's humanity, it would not do so by actually diminishing its value. It would have to do so by sending the message that his humanity failed to have unconditional or incomparable value.
How would it send that message? Granted, in refraining from acting on the patient's request, a doctor might not be respecting a particular exercise of the capacity of rational choice.
But, as we have noted, failure to respect an exercise of this capacity need not amount to a failure to respect the capacity itself. And it does not seem to in this case where for practical purposes respecting the exercise involves acting with the intention that the capacity cease to exist.
Indeed, it is acting with this intention that sends the message that humanity is not unconditionally and incomparably valuable. ALS is going to rob the patient of his humanity, but it has not done so yet. The doctor's turning off the respirator and intentionally killing the patient or, if one prefers, intentionally letting him die, suggests the idea that in the context of this patient's suffering and his insistence that she do something that will result in its cessation, his humanity is not worth preserving. The cases we have examined are ones in which actions that lead to someone's death seem to many of us to be right (morally permissible). But appeal to RFH requires us to conclude that the actions, as well as any similar to them which also fail to express respect for the value of humanity, are wrong, or so I have tried to show.
Success in showing this, even assuming as I have throughout that no viable a priori justification of RFH is at hand, does not completely discredit the respect-expression approach to FH. For one thing, someone might reject the view that the actions described are right. For such a person this paper simply works out some implications of the respect-expression approach.
Moreover, one might try to modify the approach, for example, by envisaging humanity to possess unconditional but not incomparable value. According to this reconstruction, FH would not seem to imply PFC McGinnis's action to be wrong. His sacrificing his own humanity in order to preserve that of several others would not appear to send a message that humanity falls short of unconditional value. It would appear to be consistent with the idea that his own humanity has unconditional value, just not as much as that of his comrades taken together. A challenge for this and other modifications of the respect-expression view is to accommodate our intuitions regarding the sort of cases discussed here without rendering FH otherwise implausible.
If this modification indeed implies that PFC McGinnis's action was right, would it not imply the same regarding the action of a soldier in similar circumstances who, instead of diving on the grenade himself, shoved an unwilling comrade onto it, thereby saving himself and three others?
Rather than trying to bolster the respect-expression approach to FH, philosophers attracted to FH might be better served by focusing on its distinct components. The imperative not to treat others merely as means strikes me as a productive place to start. As I have tried to show elsewhere, one can specify which actions this principle forbids without appealing to the notion that these actions fail to express respect for the unconditional and incomparable value of humanity. 62 And the prohibition on treating others merely as means is a promising candidate for a moral constraint. 63 
